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THE FOCUS IS ON THE DEEPENING OF TWO DIFFERENT ISSUES BORN 
FROM THE DECLINATION OF THE DICHOTOMY RISK / VOTE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF PROXY FIGHTS. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The work addresses the issue of cleavage in the economic risk, 
from the exercise of voting rights, mainly in the solicitation of 
proxies, primarily by analyzing the historical evolution of the legal 
framework, and the shareholders’ representation with a particular 
attention to the solicitation of proxies. 
After a general introduction to frame the institution in the 
broader contest of European and U.S. legislative environment, the 
attention needs to be focused to the close examination of the result of 
two different issues raising by the declination of the risk-vote’s 
dichotomy in the context of proxy contests. 
On one side, it embarks the attempt, which apparently has not 
been addressed in an organic mode yet, at least in Italy, to systematize 
different forms of solicitation. Two different categorizations are being 
proposed: the first one based on who holds the initiative as issuer, 
shareholders or third parties, that is the first with references to the 
solicitation’s methods through intermediaries, trustees and fiduciary 
management or regarding proxy advisors. 
The other is the dogmatic issues related to certain types of 
solicitation, with specific reference to those for which the issuer is the 
promoter, as well as the possible solutions through the argument of 
allocative techniques in chief costs to the issuer, the beneficiary of last 
instance of every legitimate solicitation. 
To better evaluate the stress points where the rift between the 
economic risk and the voting right inherent to the subjective legal 
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positions of individual members becomes pathological, the survey is 
focused on the possible limits to which administrators should incur 
about promoting a solicitation through the issuer and, conversely, the 
margins where it would be plausible to a refund of the costs incurred 
by a shareholder or by a third party imposed the issuer. 
The developed reconstruction of current regulations has shown, 
enriched by the analysis of the doctrine, as well as certain court 
judgments, that today’s architecture of the assembly system, shaped 
by providing a pre-meeting reporting mechanism that will encourage 
participation, it cracks due the distorted use of certain institutions, 
such as the shareholders’ representative which, although perfectly 
legitimate, can be easily manipulated with also a high risk of 
subornation of the shareholders. 
In conclusion this work try to demonstrate firstly how the 
guarantee of equal access to corporate funds can contribute to equality 
of treatment between directors and shareholders, and also equality of 
treatment between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
And thus it could smooth over the dissociation of economic risk from 
the exercise of voting rights at least in the context of the proxy 
solicitation, retracing some proposals for the allocation of costs as part 
of the intense debate on the subject, mostly in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
